Actual possession of an item has been shown to increase an owner's valuation of it, a phenomenon termed the "endowment effect" (Thaler, 1980). We hypothesize that temporarily being the high bidder during an auction induces a "pseudo-endowment effect." This effect may foster attachment to an item during the auction and thus promote overbidding. We examine this effect in two studies. In the first study, we examined bids from 1088 eBay Motors' passenger vehicle auctions to test for evidence of the pseudo-endowment effect and for evidence that this effect is reduced by market experience. Pseudo-endowment is measured using two proxies: the amount of time a person has participated in an individual eBay Motors' passenger vehicle auction and the aggregated duration that a bidder is listed as the high bidder for that auction.
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of empirical and anecdotal evidence that suggests that buyers often irrationally overbid in both online and traditional auctions. For example, Ariely and Simonson (2003) examined online auctions for music CDs, books, and movies (VHS & DVDs) and found that buyers overpaid in 494 (98.8%) of the 500 cases. Further, in nearly 80% of the cases, in less than 10 minutes the authors were able to find multiple online retailers who sold the item more cheaply than did the auction web site.
Another example of seemingly irrational overbidding is the "Cows on Parade" auction reported by Malhotra and Murnighan (2000) . In 1999 Chicago held a public art exhibit of fiberglass cows displayed on the streets of the city. Following the exhibition, the cows were auctioned off for various charities via live and Internet auctions. The auctioneers provided an average estimate of $3,217 for the 75 cows on the Internet auction and an average of $4,081 for the 65 cows at the live auction. The average final price for a cow on the Internet auction was $18,051 (with a high of $65,000) and the average final price for a cow at the live auction was $32,300 (with a staggering high of $110,000). On average, sale prices were 575 percent and 791 percent of the Internet and live estimates respectively. In a related study, Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2005) also report overbidding in public art auctions for fiberglass pigs in Cincinnati and Snoopies in St. Paul.
In an extreme example of overbidding in a traditional auction setting, Murnighan (2002) describes an updated version of Shubik's (1971) Dollar Auction, conducted with Executive MBA students. In auctions for $20 bills using student money, Murnighan reports winning bids of $28, $54, and even $2000.
Several researchers (for example, Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan 2005; Malhotra and Murnighan 2000; Ku, 2000; Ockenfels and Ortmann 2003) believe that this excessive bidding is the result of the competitive nature of auctions. Muringhan (2000) reports the long-held folk wisdom on auctions which suggests that people get caught up in auction fever; that is, their adrenaline starts to rush, their emotions block their ability to think clearly, and they end up bidding much more than they ever envisioned. As defined by Ku et al. (2005) , auction fever is irrational, emotionally charged overbidding. Katkar and Lucking-Reiley (2000) propose that that online bidders can get "caught up in the bidding" at low bid amounts, and end up bidding more than they would have if the bidding had started relatively high. As a result, they speculate that sellers employing a low opening bid with a high secret reserve price may be able to grease the wheels of bidding, building up bidding "momentum" that can propel the price past the amount of the secret reserve. Both Ku et al. (2005) and Ku, Galinsky, and Muringhan (2004) support this, finding that low starting bids can result in increased final prices.
However, while the growing auction fever literature is able to document overbidding in a wide variety of auction settings, several recent studies suggest a possible alternate explanation for this overbidding. These studies suggest that pre-factual feelings of ownership and the accompanying emotional attachment toward the auctioned item may lead bidders to overbid. Ariely and Simonson (2003) conjecture that during the auction process, psychological ownership may take place. A consumer with the current high bid may feel psychological ownership of the item and begin to develop an attachment to it. Ariely and Simonson (2003) use the term "pseudo-endowment effect" to denote the hypothesized increase in value caused by a person's psychological-as opposed to actual-ownership of the item. They suggest that once an item has become part of a bidder's psychological endowment, if the bidder is subsequently outbid, the attachment to the item may increase one's willingness to bid again to reclaim their lost endowment. Ariely and Simonson also suggest that the pseudo-endowment effect should be more pronounced if the consumer "owned" the item (i.e. had the highest bid) for longer periods.
In the standard demonstration of the endowment effect, a person's value for an item increases once he or she owns it. One explanation of this effect is that ownership causes increased attachment to the item, which, in turn increases its subjective value. The endowment effect is among the most widely investigated phenomenon in area of decision making, and a number of researchers have investigated the extent to which the effect is reduced by market settings with learning. While there are notable exceptions (e.g., List 2003) , several studies suggest that the endowment effect is reduced but not eliminated with market experience (e.g., Knez, Smith and Williams 1985; Coursey, Hovis and Schulze 1987; Brookshire and Coursey 1987; Shogren, Shin, Hayes and Kliebenstein 1994) .
In this article, we examine pseudo-endowment and its effect on bidding two ways, while controlling for the intensity of the auction (auction fever effects). First, we examined bids from 1088 eBay Motors' passenger vehicle auctions to test for evidence of the pseudo-endowment effect and for evidence that this effect is reduced by market experience. In our second test, we ran a controlled laboratory experiment in which we auctioned coffee mugs. To induce different levels of pre-factual ownership, we varied the amount of time that subjects examined the mugs before placing their bids.
THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT
Thaler (1980) coined the term the endowment effect to describe the fact that people often demand much more to give up an item than they are will to pay to acquire it. The endowment effect is a manifestation of an asymmetry of value that Kahneman and Tversky (1984) call loss aversion, based on the common observation that loss has a greater subjective effect than does an equivalent gain. For example, Heberlein and Bishop (1985) found that on average, people were willing to pay $31 for a particular hunting permit but were not willing to let go of the same permit for less than $143.
A well-known experimental illustration of the discrepancies between the dollar value people are willing to accept (WTA) and the dollar value they are willing to pay to purchase it (WTP) is given by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) . In the study, those who are first given coffee mugs ("sellers") were asked about the lowest sum for which they would agree to exchange the mug. Those not given mugs ("buyers") were also asked about the highest sum they would exchange for the mug. In the study, and in many similar investigations, the average selling price demanded is significantly larger than the average buying price.
Another early test of endowment effect, Knetsch and Sinden (1984) gave subjects either $2 or a lottery ticket. Later, the subjects where given an opportunity to trade their lottery ticket in for cash or pay $2 and obtain a lottery ticket. Knetsch and Sinden found that few of the subjects wanted to switch. In related work, Loewenstein and Kahneman (1991) randomly gave subjects pens and candy bars. Again, when subjects were allowed to trade, fewer than expected were willing to exchange items.
The Endowment Effect without Actual Endowment
Historically, examinations of the endowment effect have focused on situations involving actual ownership. However, recently, several studies have discovered that factual ownership is not a prerequisite for people to be effected by the endowment effect. Casey (1995) found that people demanded higher compensation to sell than they were willing to pay for lottery tickets even when they did not actually possess the tickets. Sen and Johnson (1997) showed that possessing a coupon for a product can alter a consumer's valuation of the product in a manner similar to owning the actual product. Carmon, Wertenbroch and Zeelenberg (2003) showed that thinking about an option can cause a person to increase their attachment to the option. They also note that simple consideration of an option may cause a person to feel pre-factual possession and increased discomfort from choosing an alternative option.
In related work Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) note that after a consumer partially adapts to the possession of a good, the consumer's reference point shifts. As a result, failing to acquire the item is no longer affectively neutral but now represents deprivation. They propose that deprivation induced by partial adaptation may intensify desire and motivation to acquire the item. Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) suggest the consumer who partially adapts has already had a taste and may dread the pain of forgoing further tastes. They illustrate the point with the example of a bait-and-switch victim and suggest that the victim who anticipates acquiring an item but finds it out of stock may feel deprived. Hoch and Loewenstein note that the victim may be driven to purchase a substitute item to mitigate their immediate frustration.
In two experimental studies of auction bidder behavior, Heyman, Orhun and Ariely (2004) found evidence that "quasi-endowment" or a sense of ownership affects auction rebidding. The first study involved hypothetical auction scenarios and manipulated the duration of perceived ownership by having subjects imagine that they had been the leading bidder for varying lengths of time. Heyman and his associates found that subjects told to imagine they were in the lead for longer periods of time submitted higher bids. In Heyman et al's second study, subjects participated in real dollar auctions. They found that the numbers of rounds in which bidders were allowed to participate, affected bid levels.
Given past findings that people can be affected by the endowment effect without actual ownership, we believe that online bidders will develop pre-ownership attachment to the auctioned items and will be more likely to re-bid over the course of a single, second-price, private-value, auction where the optimal strategy is to bid one's true valuation once. On eBay, for example, this will mean that the bidder will submit multiple proxy bids. Thus, H1. The probability of re-bidding is positively related to the amount of time a person has to develop a sense of ownership (a pseudo endowment) in an auction.
Endowment Effect and Experience
The endowment effect is among the most robust and persistent findings of the psychology of decision making and a number of researchers have investigated the extent to which the effect is reduced by market settings with learning. However, the results have not been conclusive.
As List (2003) notes, several laboratory studies have presented evidence suggesting that experience and the level of the endowment effect are related (e.g., Knez et al., 1985; Coursey et al., 1987; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Shogren et al., 1994) , but critics contend that at best the evidence is mixed, and overall the data do not conclusively support the underlying premise (Knetsch and Sinden, 1987; Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler 2001) .
In a field study involving sports memorabilia, List (2003) founds that the endowment effect is eliminated with experience, suggesting that value disparities are an artifact of the lack of market experience. However, most examinations into the area have found that while experience reduces the effect, that the gap between WTP and WTA is persistent. For example, Coursey et al. (1987) report that the endowment effect diminishes in a market setting with experience but that even after several rounds the gap between WTP and WTA of subjects remains. Experiments by Knetsch and Sinden (1987) also show that the effect is reduced with experience but remains significant throughout the experiment. Consistent with the above, we hypothesize that bidders with more experience in online auctions will be less affected by the pseudo-endowment effect.
Thus,
H2. If present in online auctions, the pseudo-endowment effect is reduced with market experience.
THE FIELD STUDY
To test our hypothesis we have chosen to examine data collected from eBay Motors' To ensure that we captured potential re-bidding, each of the 1088 auctions we examined contained at least two bids, and only the bids of high bidders were included. Also to eliminate the effects of strategic last minute bidding or sniping, we excluded all bids placed within the final hour and the bids that were sniped. To eliminate other forms of strategic bidding, we only include those bids which result in the bidder becoming the high bidder. In addition, we only include actual bids placed by auction participants. Proxy bids generated by eBay's automatic bidding system where omitted from our analysis. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 .
Bidder's Experience with eBay Auctions
eBay allows buyers to rate sellers and sellers to rate their buyers. In each eBay auction, following every seller's or bidder's member name, which serves as a unique identifier, is a number in parentheses. In the case of a seller, the information is displayed as follows:
Seller membername (265)
The number is a summary measure of a person's reputation in the eBay market.
Registered users are allowed to post positive, negative, and neutral comments about users with whom they have traded. Each positive comment is given a score of +1, each negative comment is given a score of -1, with neutral comments not affecting one's score in either direction. Thus a score of 10 might mean 10 positive comments, or 110 positive comments and 100 negative comments and any number of neutral comments. An interesting enforcement mechanism is that eBay users with a net negative score of -4 or lower are automatically barred from trading by the software system (Kollock, 1999) .
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001) report that eBay buyers commented on sellers for 52.1%
of the items, sellers on buyers 60.6% of the time. Of feedback provided by eBay buyers, 99.1%
were positive. Similarly, eBay sellers provided positive feedback on buyers 98.1% of the time.
For this study, while recognizing the limitations, we are using the bidders' feedback rating as a proxy for their market experience.
Empirical Specifications
If online bidding is affected by a pseudo-endowment effect, we would expect that this effect would be more pronounced for bidders who have participated in the auction for longer periods of time. In addition, we would also expect that this effect would be more pronounced for bidders who have been listed as the high bidder for longer periods of time.
As a result, we would expect to find that those with greater accumulated time in an auction and those with greater accumulated time as the high bidder in an auction should be more likely to re-bid. If experience reduces the effect, we would expect those bidders with more exposure to eBay (i.e. those with higher feedback ratings) to be less likely to re-bid. To test the above hypotheses, we use a probit model to estimate the effect of accumulated time as high bidder for an auction and the bidder's feedback rating on the probability that the bidder will rebid in the auction. To control for the effect of competition, we include the number of bids placed in the auction (Bids) at the time the participant placed their bid. Our two models follow:
(1) TheBidderWillRebid = ȕ 1 * TimeasHighBidder + ȕ 2 *BidderRating+ ȕ 3 * Bids (2) TheBidderWillRebid = ȕ 1 * TimeinAuction + ȕ 2 *BidderRating+ ȕ 3 * Bids
In the above, TheBidderWillRebid is set 1 if the bidder places a subsequent bid in the same auction and set to 0 if the bidder fails to bid again. TimeasHighBidder denotes the aggregated duration that a bidder is the high bidder for the auction. It is calculated as the number of days between the time the bidder first placed the highest bid and the time that their bid is superseded by another. Bidder rating is the bidder's eBay feedback rating which is the result of unique positive minus unique negative feedback. TimeinAuction denotes duration that a bidder has participated in the auction. It is calculated as the number of days since the time the bidder placed their first bid in the auction. Table 2 summarizes the results of our empirical tests. The table provides evidence that online bidding is positively affected by a pseudo-endowment effect. Specifically, the bidders who have participated in the auction for longer periods of time are significantly more likely to rebid. In addition, our data suggest that the bidders listed as the high bidder for longer periods of time are significantly more likely to re-bid. Our data suggest that the level of competition also significantly affects a bidder's likeliness to re-bid. When including interaction terms for competition and pseudo-endowment, our data suggest that the effect of time as high bidder and the number of bidders is multiplicative and that the effect of duration of auction participation and the number of bidders is additive. Finally, our data suggest the pseudo-endowment effect is reduced with experience. Specifically, those bidders with higher feedback ratings are less likely to re-bid.
Field Study Results
However, while the eBay Motors auction data described above are consistent with the hypothesized effect, it does not permit us to rule out several competing explanations. To rule out such alternative explanations, we performed a related test using a controlled laboratory setting.
THE EXPERIMENT
The purpose of this experiment is to test further the effect of subjects' duration of prefactual ownership on their willingness to bid. The canonical endowment effect test examines subjects' valuations of coffee mugs. In our study we will perform a variation of the classic mug experiment by varying the amount of time subjects interact with a coffee mug. We will then ask participants to bid on their mugs.
Subjects and Design
Again, if bidding is affected by a pseudo-endowment effect, we would expect that bids would be higher for participants who interact with their mugs for longer periods of time.
A total of 60 students from an introductory information systems course at a large Midwestern university participated in the study. The coffee mugs were purchased at a campus area bookstore located directly across from the building where the study was conducted. Subjects were informed that the mugs cost $3.95 and that several identical mugs were still available at the bookstore. The mugs were new, unused, and each still had their original price tags affixed. Each group was randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In total, there were 10 groups of six subjects each.
The experiment was conducted using one group at a time. Prior to the experiment, subjects were asked to sit outside the experiment room until all members of the group were present. Once an entire group had arrived, all subjects in that group were ushered into the room at the same time and asked to sit at one of six desks. Subjects were told not to touch the mug until instructed to do so. Once all subjects were seated, they were instructed to begin examining their mugs. In the short duration group, subjects were told to examine their coffee mug for 10 seconds, in the longer duration group, subjects examined the mug for 30 seconds. After the designated time elapsed, subjects were instructed to put down their mugs and to enter the maximum that they would be willing to bid on their bidding sheet. After entering their bid, subjects were instructed to turn over their bid sheets.
After all subjects had bid, subjects were instructed to hold up their bid sheet and the high bidder was determined. At this time, the five low bidders were paid $10 each. The high bidder was given the option of keeping the mug and receiving $10 minus their bid, or selling the mug back for $3.95 and receiving $10 minus their bid plus $3.95.
Experimental Results
To test for the affect of duration on willingness to bid, we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) using subject bid as the dependent variable and duration of examination as the independent variable. The model was statistically significant [F(1, 58) = 4.46, p = .039], and the overall results suggest a pseudo-endowment effect. Figure 1 shows that the average bid was $2.24 for the short duration group and $3.07 for the longer duration group. Another interesting result was that three of the five winners in the long duration groups actually chose to keep their mugs paying $6.00, $5.00, and $5.00 respectively. None of the short duration condition winners chose to keep their mug.
CONCLUSION
Traditional retailers have long known the value of enhancing the attachment between their buyers and their products. It is partially for this reason that GM and others offer 24-hour test drives to their customers. Car dealers intuitively suspect that if a customer drives a car home, they will be more likely to develop an attachment to the vehicle and ultimately more likely to purchase. This phenomenon is not exclusive to car buyers, and one can easily see examples in a variety of retail sectors. For example, pet store owners set aside special areas so customers can play with the puppies. However, many of the methods available to traditional retailers are not possible online. Still, our data suggest that online auction bidders are affected by the endowment effect even without actual endowment, and the effect is significantly reduced by experience.
Both studies described above suggest that online sellers may be able to benefit from the understanding the effect buyers' attachment has on willingness to pay. For example, many online auction sites add to a bidder's pre-factual feelings of ownership by prominently listing the name of the high bidder on the auction's detail page. They also add to the loss experienced when a consumer is outbid by contacting the previous high bidder via email and alerting that person to the fact that he or she is no longer winning the auction.
This work makes several contributions to the growing literature on pseudo-endowment.
This work is the first to examine pseudo-endowment's affect on rebidding. Our field study is the first to directly tests Ariely and Simonson's (2003) conjecture that attachment to an object may lead bidders to rebid on an item after they have been outbid by another bidder. While related, Heyman et al. (2004) examine the effects of pseudo-endowment by examining final bids. In other work that looks at pseudo-endowment and rebidding in online auctions, Simonson and
Ariely (2005) do not test for the effect of attachment on rebidding, but instead control for attachment by excluding rebids from portions of their analysis.
Next, this work examines pseudo-endowment in a real life setting of eBay motor vehicle auctions. Using data from actual auctions allows us to examine two proxies for a bidder's attachment to the auctioned item. Our data suggest that both Time as the High Bidder and duration of auction participation affect a bidders likelihood of rebidding if they are subsequently outbid by another bidder.
Another unique feature of our analysis is our examination of the interaction of competition (or opponent effect) and two pseudo-endowment proxies. While Heyman and associates test for an interaction between duration of auction participation and an opponent effect, in both studies reported, the duration of auction participation and time as high bidder are bundled as a single variable. Our data suggest that the effects of time as high bidder and the number of bidders are multiplicative. However, consistent with Heyman et al., our data suggest that the effects of the duration of auction participation and the number of bidders are additive.
Another contribution of this work is that it is the first to exam the effect of experience on pseudo-endowment. Consistent with several studies, which involve actual endowment (e.g., Knez et al., 1985; Coursey et al., 1987; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Shogren et al., 1994) , our data suggest that the pseudo-endowment effect is reduced with market experience. Finally, in our mug experiment, we are able to hold competition constant and for the first time, test for the effect of pseudo-endowment absent any competitive or opponent effects. In this setting, our data suggests that even without competitive effects, pseudo-endowment affects bid levels.
While several researchers propose that overbidding in auctions may be the result of competition-induced auction fever, the current research suggests that overbidding may be, at least partially, the result of bidders' growing attachment to the item during the auction. Our findings are consistent with Ariely and Simonson (2003) who suggested that once an item has become part of a bidder's psychological endowment, if they are subsequently outbid, the attachment to the item may increase their willingness to bid again to reclaim their lost endowment. Ariely and Simonson also predict that the pseudo-endowment effect will be more pronounced if the consumer owned the item (i.e. had the highest bid) for longer periods. Our findings provide empirical support to their conjecture.
While this work supports the notion that bidding in auctions is affected by a pseudoendowment effect, the findings are also consistent with much of the auction fever research. For example, Ku et al. (2005) , note that there is more overbidding in live auctions than in Internet auctions, there is more overbidding in auctions with longer periods, and auction winners were happier, even if they bid past their limit, than non-winners. Each of these findings is consistent with a pseudo-endowment effect. In addition, Ku et al. found that winners, even those that bid past their ex ante limits, had fewer regrets than losers. This seems to lend credence to a change in valuation during the auction process rather than point to an emotionally charged, momentary madness. While this work represents an important step toward understanding why auction participants often overbid, more work is needed to learn the boundaries of time and experience on consumers' perceptions of pre-factual ownership and to disentangle the effects of bidders' desire to win the item from bidders' desire to simply win the auction. 
